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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-THE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL PROBATION ACT TO THE CORPORATE ENTITY. UNITED STATES V.
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD, 465 F.2d 58 (1972).
Corporate liability for criminal activity and the extent to which a
convicted corporation may be punished are issues of increasing relevance. With the rapid growth of the corporate entity and the effect
which its activities have on our society, there has developed a greater
concern for the manner in which this complex structure seemingly
avoids the sanctions of criminal law .
United States u. Atlantic Richfield Company, I addresses itself to the
question of criminal punishment of corporations through the use of the
Federal Probation Act, 2 and enlarges upon the penalties which are
available for such crimes. In March, 1971, the U.S. Coast Guard
observed the discharge of oil into the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal
from Atlantic Richfield's Stickney, Illinois dock facility. The United
States Attorney subsequently filed a criminal information against Atlantic Richfield for violation of sections 407 and 411 of Title 33,
United States Code, 1964. 3 The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to
the charge of discharging refuse into navigable waters. From a conviction and the imposition of probation in lieu of the statutorily proscribed penalty,4 the defendant filed a motion to vacate and correct the
sentence. The defendant alleged that the Act did not apply to corporations, that the conditions of probation imposed upon it were not
authorized by law or by statute, and that it could not be placed on
probation against its desires.
On appeal, the defendant-corporation asserted that the references to
"he," "him" or "defendant" in the Act, in addition to the frequent
association of probation with youthful or first-time offenders, indicates
the legislative intent that probation be imposed only upon natural
persons. s Atlantic Richfield further argued that since the inception of
the Federal Probation Act, it had been applied only to persons. Therefore, by negative inference, a corporate entity is precluded from the
purview of the Act. This reasoning has for many years represented
corporate resistance to the applicability of any criminal statutes, an
argument which is regarded as archaic by more recent court decisions. 6
465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970) (hereinafter cited as The Act).
River and Harbors Act of 1899.
The statutory sentence proscribes a fine for corporations of not less than $500 nor more
than $2500. For natural persons the statutory penalty is the fine and/or imprisonment for
not more than 1 year nor less than 30 days. [d. § 411 (1964).
5. 465 F.2d at 60.
6. "The whole argument ... that corporations are immune from the sanctions afforded by the
Criminal Code is based upon doctrines which have been entirely outgrown by the modern
corporation and have long been obsolete." New York Cent. & Hudson River RR v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 488 (1909); accord, United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50,

1.
2.
3.
4.
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Although the court did find that the conditions of probation were
onerous and remanded the case with the direction to reframe those
conditions,7 the lower court's opinion that a corporation is a proper
subject for probation was affirmed. On remand, the lower court reapplied the probation in more definitive terms but then discharged the
defendant from this status because of its good faith efforts to abate
further illegal discharge. s For the first time since the Federal Probation
Act was enacted in 1925, a corporation was subjected to the broad
discretion of court-imposed conditions and supervision available
through the suspension of sentence. 9 Rather than imposing a relatively
nominal fine 1 0 and risking the possibility of continued criminal activity
by the defendant, the court action made a positive attempt to coerce
the offending corporation into compliance with regulatory statutes.
The court based its determination that the defendant could be
subjected to probation upon two conclusions: (1) many provisions of
the federal criminal code make it clear that the term "defendant" is
intended to include corporate parties 1 1 and (2) the language of the
Probation Act expressly applies to criminal offenses for which only a
fine may be appropriate. 1 2 Since the primary purpose of the Act is to
facilitate rehabilitation of the offender and to provide restitution for
the victim(s),l 3 the court found no inconsistency in applying the
Federal Probation Act to the corporate defendant. The court refuted

7.
8.

9.
10.
~l.

12.
13.

54-55 (1909). C{. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, :307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir.
1962) (knowledge by corporation necessary for conviction): United States v. S.S.
Mormacsaga, 204 F.Supp. 701, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (not necessary to show scienter for
conviction under § 411): accord, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp .. 328 F.Supp. 354, 356
(Ind. 1970).
465 F.2d at 6l.
On Sept. 9, 1972, Judge Parsons of the District Court of Illinois, Eastern Division, issued
the following minute order (cause No. i1 CR 524):
Imposition of sentence suspended and deft. Atlantic Richfield Co. is ordered
placed on probation for a period of two (2) yrs. A condition of probation being that
adequate facilities be installed to eliminate pollution, the pollution complained of in
the information and to prevent any further pollution of the same order. The court this
date being satisfied and convinced that the condition heretofore pronounced nunc
pro tunc June 25, 19i1 has been met and that further probation will serve no useful
purpose, enters its orders discharging Atlantic Richfield.
The court's satisfaction that the conditions had been met in the interim, was the result of
Atlantic Richfield's $140,000 installation of a new sewage and pumping system, and an
eleven foot deep "bentonite" curtain into the soil to abate further seepage into the water
(telephone conversation with Robert E. Ackerberg, partner with Schiff, Hardin & Waite,
Chicago, Illinois, Mar. 7. 1974).
Prior to The Act, corporations were held not subject to a suspended sentence. State ex reI.
Howell County v. West Plains Tel. Co., 232 Mo. 579, 135 S.W. 20 (1911).
Cr. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations ... as well as individuals .... " 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); United States v. Beacon Piece Dyeing
& Finishing Co., 455 F .2d 216 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Berger, 145 F.2d 888,890 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
•
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). The legislative history is based on 18 U.S.C. § 724 (1940).
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the argument that probation is merely a means of dealing with youthful
or first offenders and cannot be applied to other criminals. I 4 The court
noted that the Federal Probation Act has always received a construction that is consistent with the emphasis in modern criminal theory on
providing the sentencing court with the opportunity to "analyze and
evaluate the character, qualities, and possibilities of each offender"! 5
in order to effect individualized treatment. But to misconstrue this
individualized treatment as solely an act of grace or clemency was
noted in United States v. Durkin! 6 as a failure to recognize that
probation is primarily for the benefit of society, which is the victim of
criminal activity, and only of incidental benefit to the accused.
The consideration of the public good and the recognition that courts
need a more flexible penalty were the motivating factors in Congress'
passage of an Act which would allow courts to suspend imposition of
execution of sentence in order to apply a more effective remedy. I 7
Throughout the Act's ten-year legislative history, the intent of liberal
construction! 8 and court determination of applicability and administration continued as the goal of Congress. I 9 After two years of drawing
up the first Federal Probation Act, Congress passed it, but the bill was
vetoed by the President in 1917. 20 The subject of Congressional disagree14. United States v. Johnson, 56 F.2d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 1932).
15. Legislation should be construed in conformity with its purpose. S.E.C. y. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344. 350 (1943); United States v. Banks. 108 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.
Minn. 1952). Because the Probation Act is of a remedial nature. it has been consistently
held that the Act should be liberally construed. Reeves Y. United States. 14 F.2d 5. 7 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 719 (1926). See also textual quote of the Federal
Probation Act, infra.
16. 153 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1946); State ex rei. Caldwell v. Skinner, 59 S.D. 68, 73, 238 N.W.
149. 152 (1931) states;
Laws permitting probation ... are manifestations of a comparatively modern
shift in criminological theory; the trend being away from the so-called "strict law"
which demanded a fixed and positive penalty for every crime and the infliction
thereof in every case to which it might be applicable. and toward the theory that
some degree of discretion should be vested in a judge. probation officer, or other
board or body. permitting an adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
particular criminal and the circumstances of his individual case. This latter
method has corne to be known to criminologists as "individualization of punishment." and its real foundation lies, not in the desire to deal kindly or charitably with
an individual defendant, not in humanitarianism or sympathy, but primarily in the
belief that the welfare of the state and of organized society will be better served by
adjusting the treatment of the criminal to his character and the circumstances of
his crime rather than to the mere nature and classification of the crime itself.
Benefit to the individual is incidental.
17. Roberts v. United States. :320 U.S. 264, 272 (194:3).
18. Even greater latitude must be recognized where Congress grants broad discretionary
powers to courts, for the constitutional functional role of courts necessarily requires the
frequent application of judgment in the exercise of discretion. United States v. Baker, 429
F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). See Yin-Shing Woo v. United States. 288 F.2d 434.435 (2d
Cir. 1961).
19. United States v. Baker. 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). "Probation may be granted
whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." 18 U.S.C.· § 3651
(1970).
20. Hearings on S. 1092 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 5, 6 (1916).
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ment was the constitutional issue of whether the court could be granted
the broader power to impose a sentence and then suspend its execution.
The conflicting views continually reiterated the legislative purpose of
probation, to contribute to the proper and uniform administration of
criminal justice and to empower the courts with greater latitude in
determining the appropriate penalty for a crimina1. 21 Despite the
consideration of young or first-time offenders, the foremost Congressional motive was a need for a flexible and remedial penalty that
would encourage criminal reform. The Act was therefore not exclusive
and only general guidelines were established for its use. When the
Probation Act finally became law in 1925, it neither stated nor implied
any stipulation as to "who" was not the subject of the court's new
power. This gave the courts, ~ broarl ai. , ti()l' which they exercise in
determining probation.
Applying these guidelines of statutory construction, the Atlantic
Richfield court relied upon section 3651 of the Federal Probation Act:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not
punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having
jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when
satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such terms and conditions as the
court deems best. 2 2
As a federal statute, the Probation Act must be compatible with the
federal criminal code and with the principle of corporate criminal
liability. The former expressly applies to corporations 23 and the latter
is well settled law. 24 The court therefore reasoned that sections 407
and 411 of the Federal Probation Act should be applied to the corporate entity.
The significance of this conclusion, however, is diminished by the
court's finding that the conditions of probation imposed by the lower
court were onerous and go "beyond what was intended by the drafters
of the Probation Act."2 5 In a cursory explanation, the court failed to
21. Federal Probation Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970).
22. 465 F.2d at 60; 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970) (emphasis added).
23. See note 9 supra.
24.
It is impossible to believe that corporations were intentionally excluded. They are as
much within the mischief aimed at as private persons. and as capable of a "wilful"
breach of the law .... And if we free our minds from the notion that criminal
statutes must be construed by some artifical and conventional rule, the natural
inference, when a statute prescribes two independent penalities, is that it means to
inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of them is impossible, it does not mean
on that account to let the defendant escape.
United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); New York Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481. 492-493 (1909); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v.
United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
25. 465 F.2d at 61.
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establish proper guidelines by which the lower court could reframe the
conditions on remand. 26 Without specifically addressing itself to the
terms of the probation, the court expressed the limitation that they
could not be "unreasonable standards to the extent that the probationer may not know when they are satisfied."2 7 Despite the merit of
this statement, it seems inapplicable to the terms imposed upon Atlantic Richfield by the district court.
The terms of Atlantic Richfield's probation were: (1) that Atlantic
Richfield set up and complete a program within forty-five (45) days to
handle 2 B oil spillage into the soil and/or stream; and (2) if the first
condition was not fulfilled, a Special Probation Officer would be
appointed. 29 In essence, Atlantic Richfield was capable of ending its
probation at will be merely establishing an approved program. Even if
the terms were determined to be unduly severe in respect to the time
limit, there does not appear to be the vague or indeterminable requirements to which the appellate court alludes. Rather, the purpose seems
to be within the spirit of making the corporate probationer "subject to
surveillance, and to such restrictions as the court may impose,,,3 0 as
long as these conditions are sufficiently definite to be enforceable. 3 I It
is not unduly burdensome, therefore, to require Atlantic Richfield to
cease its violation of a criminal statute by directing it to find some
means of disposing of oil other than discharging it into navigable
waters. To require a wrongdoer to cease his criminal activity is certainly
not a condition of a more onerous nature than the Congress or constitutional safeguards of due process and equal protection 32 would permit.
In fact, the Act further provides that, while on probation, the defendant "may be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for
which conviction was had .... "3 3 If any specific injury to property or
person had been determined in the instant case this aspect of probation
26. [d.
27. [d.

28. The inference of the Atlantic Richfield court's use of the phrase "set up a program ... to
handle" is that the Atlantic Richfield Co. is required to complete an affirmati\'e act in
order to abide by the terms of probation.
29. Upon the defendant's motion to correct the sentence. the lower court amended the
conditions as follows:
(1) the period of compliance is to be extended from 45 days to 60 days and may be
further extended by the court upon request of the Probation Officer.
(2) If the Probation Officer reports to the court that the defendant is not complying without undue delay, then as a condition upon a condition #(1) will come
into effect.
465 F.2d at 61.
30. Cooper v. United States. 91 F.2d 195. 199 (5th Cir. 1937).
31. United States v. Koppelman. 53 F. Supp. 499. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1943).
32. Heinz. The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation. 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 483 (1962).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), United States v. Buchanan, 340 F. Supp. 1285 (D. N.C. 1972);
People v. E'Elia, 73 Cal. App. 2d 264. 167 P.2d 253, 255 (1946).
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could have been implemented to repay aggrieved parties for actual
damages or loss caused by the criminal offense. 3 4
The broad discretionary powers which the Probation Act affords the
court have been, on occasion, challenged as an unconstitutional failure
of Congress to specify the standards of its application and administration. 35 The most recent opinion to refute this argument is found in
United States u. Baker,3 6 which reiterated the legislative intent to
empower courts with the ability to consider the interests of society, the
offense committed and the character of the criminal in determining the
most appropriate means to curtail further crime and to encourage
rehabilitation. 37 The constitutional parameters of probation require
that the terms have a reasonable bearing on the prevention of future
crimes by the accused and, if applicable, encourage restitution by the
offender for injury that resulted from the illegal activity.3 1\ It would
therefore appear that for the court to conclude that a condition is
onerous and vague which requires a wrongdoer to stop his criminal
activity represents a misinterpretation of the Probation Act. As a
reforming discipline, the Act does not preclude coercion in administering terms and conditions. The reasonableness of such terms is to. be
measured by the relation they have to the crime committed. 3 9 For this
reason the court has the continuing power to modify, revoke or impose
conditions during the period of probation 40 and need not expressly
state all conditions of probation in the sentence. 4 I
Despite the A tlantic Richfield court's conclusion that the terms of
probation do not fulfill the requirement of such ascertainable standards
that the probationer may know when they are satisfied, the final
determination of unreasonableness is not without merit. While the

Cr..

34. 28 U.S.C. § 22.55 (1970).
Freeman v. United States. 254 F.2d :352 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(reparation may be a proper restitutionary condition despite the use of the criminal
process to collect a civil debt).
35. United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1970) (defendant's contention
rejected by the court).
36. [d. at·1347. Cunningham \'. United States. 256 F.2d 467. 472-473 (5th Cir. 1958): accord.
Nix v. James. 7 F.2d 590. 593 (9th Cir. 1925),
37. In assessing the judicial powers delegated by Probation Act. the Baker court quoted the
following observation of Judge Learned Hand:
Not infrequently a legislature means to leave to the judges the appraisal of some
of the values at stake .... They require of the compromise that they think in accord with the general purposes of the measure as the community would understand
it. We are of course aware of the resulting uncertainties involved in such an
interpretation: but the alternative would be specifically to provide for each
situation that can arise. a substitute utterly impractical in operation.
United States v. Baker. 429 F.2d 1344. 1347 (7th Cir. 1970).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
39. Whaley v. United States. 324 F.2d 356. 359 (9th Cir. 1963). cert. denied. 376 U.S. 911
(1963). reh. denied. 376 U.S. 966 (1963),
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651. 3653 (1964): United States v. Longknife, 258 F. Supp. 303. 306-307 (D.
Hawaii 1966), affd. 381 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967). cert. denied. 390 U.S. 926 (1967): United
States v. Squillante. 144 F. Supp. 494. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1956l.
41. Yates v. United States. 308 F.2d 737. 739 (10th Cir. 1962); accord. Kaplan \'. United
States, 324 F.2d 345. 348-349 (8th Cir. 1956).
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latitude which the Probation Act affords the,judiciary in determining
an appropriate penalty is extremely broad, it is not within the spirit of
this power to impose punishment greater than that which is statutorily
proscribed by law if suspension of sentence and probation were not
granted. 42 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,43 under which Atlantic Richfield was convicted, provides for a penalty of not less than $500
nor more than $2500, a fine which at its maximum represents a
nominal sum to a large public corporation. This is to be compared with
the time consuming and expensive task of Atlantic Richfield in handling the discharge of oil in a manner other than by the pollution of
navigable waters (probation condition #1).44 As a practical matter, the
latter imposes upon the offender a more stringent and inconvenient
penalty than the statutorily proscribed fine. But if the premise of
probation, to effect the best possible reform of the offender in consideration of the public good, is to be adhered to, it does not seem
inconsistent to suspend sentence in order to coerce the convicted party
into a cessation of illegal activity.4 5 What does seem inconsistent with
the Probation Act and with the entire criminal code is that a large
public corporation, such as the defendant, might avoid the remedial
intent of the penalty. As in A tlantic Richfield, a corporate criminal
may effectively persuade a court that its compliance with the antipollution intention of the Rivers and Harbors Act is a condition of such an
onerous and arbitrary nature as to deprive the criminal of constitutional
due process and to exceed the congressional authority for probation in
the federal judicial system. Since the law is replete with opinions that
point to the need to deter and reform the criminal offender by
whatever discipline is available to the court,4 6 it does not appear that a
convicted offender is unduly burdened by a requirement to reform. 4 7
An analogy to the remedies available in a court of equity further
42. Whaley v. United States, 324 U.S. 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1963).
The court cannot impose conditions that cannot be fulfilled within the probationary term.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
44. See p. 298 supra.
45. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932). The aura of "corporate crime" has
traditionally evoked less repugnance and condemnation than similar activities of the
individual criminal. Some of the reasons for this duplicity are:
(1) The effect of a corporation's crime is diffuse in nature and frequently
unapparent to the general public. A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL POWER TO PRESERVE
THE ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: PRIORITIES, POLICIES AND THE LAW 235. (F. Grad, G. Rathgens, A.
Rosenthal eds., 1971).
(2) "Businessmen develop rationalizations which conceal the fact of crime." E.
SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 222, 225 (1949).
(3) The complexity of the illegal activity in which corporations indulge is generally
greater than the more publicized mens rea crimes. Geis, Criminal Penalties
for Corporate Crimes, 8 CRIM. LAW BULL. 377-388 (1972).
46. Roberts v. Unites States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943); United States v. Banks, 108 F. Supp. 14 (D.
Minn. 1952).
47. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (lOth Cir. 1971); Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mo.
1945).
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supports a broader use of probationary conditons than the Atlantic
Richfield court was willing to consider. Probation and injunctive relief
are both remedial in nature, although the latter is seldom imposed in
criminal actions. As such, they offer the court an opportunity to affix a
condition of reform that is commensurate with the offense and the
character of the offender. Injunctive relief serves as the swiftest and
surest means of halting wrongdoing. An injunction to halt wrongdoing
is not based upon the hardship and economic repercussions that may
have to be endured by the enjoined party; rather, the nature of the
wrongdoing act and injury to its victims are the primary considerations. 48 Such an intent is likewise manifested in the directive powers
delegated to the court by the Probation Act through the broad and
liberal construction it has consistently received. 4 9
Another aspect the Act's application raised in A tlar;tic Richfield is
the issue of a corporation's right to refuse probation. Despite the
importance of this point, the court relied upon its determination that
the terms of probation imposed by the lower court abused the spirit of
the Probation Act and summarily excused itself from commenting on
whether the defendant could demand sentence pursuant to the terms of
the act violated: "[W] e find it unnecessary to decide whether or not
the guilty party has the right to refuse probation and insist upon
imposition of the statutorily proscribed sentence."s 0 The necessity of
addressing this question may not have confronted the Atlantic Richfield court; but some direction might have been offered to the lower
court as the purpose of remand was an alteration of the probationary
conditions.
In a few jurisdictions the defendant is given the right to refuse
probation and accept the criminal penalties. s 1 This right of rejection
appears to be based on an interpretation of probation as exclusively an
"act of grace or clemency"S 2 rather than an alternative remedial
sentence with which the defendant cannot bargain.s 3 The Federal
Probation Act makes no such distinction and neither states nor infers
that a convicted criminal may refuse the terms of probation. The two
48. State ex reI. Valley Distributors, Inc. v. Oakley, 153 W. Va. 94. 168 S.E.2d 532 (1969) (sale
of merchandise on Sunday enjoined despite adverse economic effect!. Equity readily
enjoins any nuisance that offends property rights and thereby causes injury. As to
tne possibility of applying injunctive relief under certain sections of the River and Harbors
Act, see Kramon. Section 10 of the River and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New
Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REV. 229, 260-63 (1973).
49. Escoe v. Zerbst. 295 U.S. 490 (1935); United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970);
18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970).
50. 465 F.2d at 61.
51. People v. Billingsley. 59 Cal. App. 2d 846, 139 P.2d 362 (1943); State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576,
86 S.E.2d 203 (1955). "The statutes [California 1concerning probation contain no provision
as to its acceptance or rejection. However, it is settled [m the Jurisdiction of California 1
that a defendant has the right to refuse probation, for its conditions may appear more
onerous than the sentence which might be imposed." In re Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371,377,334
P.2d 1, 8 (1958), accord People v. Caruso, 52 Cal. 2d 786, 345 P.2d 282 (1959).
52. People v. Caruso, 52 Cal.2d 786, 801, 345 P.2d 282, 296 (1959).
53. Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cit. 1937).
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views of probation, as purely a quasi-legal means of dealing with
juveniles or first-time offenders, and the purpose of serving the best
interest of public good as expressed by the Federal Probation Act, are
distinguished in the local probation law of Maryland.
[The courts] ... before conviction of any person accused of
crimes with the written consent of the person so accused, ...
whether a minor or an adult, and after conviction of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, without such consent, are empowered to:
(1) Suspend the imposition of sentence; or
(2) Place such person on probation without finding a verdict; and
(3) Make such conditions of suspension of sentence as the
court may deem proper. s 4
Consent of the defendant only is required when a plea of "innocent"
has been enterecl.: s S the court then may choose not to find guilt or
innocence but place the accused on "probation without verdict." The
statutory law of Maryland thus reflects an awareness of the complete
legal fiction of a "sentence" without determining guilt and therefore
requires the accused's consent to impose it.s 6 In Skinker v. State, S 7 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland notes this quirk in the local administration of probation and takes care to mention that no such procedure
exists on the federal level. "Avoidance of the stigma of a criminal
record, indeed, is the raison d'etre of the procedure. There is, however,
a singular lack of authority in the United States in regard to the scope,
procedure, and nature of probation without verdict."s 8 The right to
refuse probation is recognized only when no plea or a plea of "innocent" has been entered and the court, in its wisdom, attempts to
withhold the stigma of a verdict. Despite the good intentions of this
accepted practice, an accused must be granted the appealable basis of a
verdict if it is demanded. S 9
On the federal level, suspension of sentence is a prerequisite to the
application of the Federal Probation Act. Under these conditions, the
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1972) (emphasis added).
55. [d.
56. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 239, 242, 210 A.2d 716, 719, 721 (1965); c{. State v. Jacob,
234 Md. 454, 199 A.2d 803 (1964); Sutherland, The Position in the United States with Regard to Probation and Conviction, 19 CAN. BAR REV. 522, 523 (1941):
It is necessary that the court be convinced that the defendant has engaged in
criminal behaviour before probation can be ordered. Conviction is implicit in that
finding and that order, and it is made explicit by the pronouncement of a few words.
Consequently probation without conviction is a legal fiction.
57. 239 Md. 234, 210 A.2d 716 (1965).
58. [d. at 239, 210 A.2d at 719 (citation omitted). The Federal Probation Act presupposes a
conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970) begins: "Upon entering a judgment of conviction .... "
59. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 242, 210 A.2d 716, 721 (1965).
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Act "vests a discretion in the court, not a choice in the convict."6 0 A
plea of guilty, or nolo contendere, as in A tlantic Richfield, compels the
defendant to submit to the court's discretion in choosing either the
statutory proscription or the conditions of probation. The only requirement necessary to satisfy the defendant's right of due process is a
"lawful trial to convict, and a lawful conviction in order to sentence. "6 1 Atlantic Richfield's plea of nolo contendere is a complete
submission to the court's power to sentence. It is a groundless assertion
to suggest that any further right to bargain with the court or object to
its discretion is retained by the defendant.
Although the Atlantic Richfield Company did not have the option to
refuse probation and demand the fine, a subsequent disregard of probationary conditions would appear to create the same result. The exclusive statutory penalty upon revocation of probation is the execution of
the suspended sentence. 6 2 Additional punishment of the probationer in
excess of the suspended sentence pursuant to the original cause of
action would be beyond the court's power and violative of due process
guarantees. 63 Accordingly, a citation for the corporation's contempt of
a court order (the conditions of probation) would be an illegal double
punishment that cannot be used when the status of probation is
revoked. 64 Rather than attempting to coerce the corporate entity into
compliance, the Atlantic Richfield court might have held that in view
of the prosecution and finding of guilt, the corporate officers most
closely allied with the Stickney, Illinois, facility were put on actual
notice of the illegal activity. Such an imputation of knowledge would
enable the court to find individual responsibility if the discharge of oil
continued after the reasonable time established by the probation. If the
corporate officers had been directed by the court to oversee future
compliance with sections 407 and 411 of the River and Harbors Act,
their failure to abide by the court order would result in not only a
revocation of the corporation's probation and imposition of the fine,
but also a citation for contempt issued to the previously determined

60. Cooper v. United States. 91 F.2d 195. 199 (5th Cir. 1937): cf. Birnbaum v. United States.
107 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1939).
61. Ruckle \'. Warden, 335 F.2d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). cert. denied 379
U.S. 934 (1964).
62. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264. 266 n.2 (1943):
At any time within the probation period the probation officer may arrest the
probationer ... or the court which has granted the probation may issue a warrant
for his arrest .... [and] such probationer shall forthwith be taken before the
court .... Thereupon the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of
sentence. and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.
63. United States v. Young. 17 F.2d 129 (N.D. Cal. 19:27).
64. Despite its inapplicability to the revocation of probation, contempt has been used to cite a
corporate entity for its failure to abide by a court order. United States v. Kormel. Inc .. 230
F. Supp. 275 (D. Nev. 1964) (defiance of a temporary restraining order by means of misrepresentations of material facts on the sale of stocks).
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responsible agents. 65 The guilty parties could then be imprisoned or
heavily fined for their lack of diligence. The failure of the individual to
display a good faith effort to alter the policy of illegal discharge creates
the fundamental characteristic of the traditional malum in se offense. 6 6
The Atlantic Richfield court, even if it could not determine individual
wrongdoing, could have "personalized" any further violation by placing
the corporate officers on notice when the probationary conditions were
framed. 67 This would not be beyond the general scope or purpose of
the Federal Probation Act, nor would this ancillary directive to corporate officers place an onerous, arbitrary condition upon the corporate defendant.
Atlantic Richfield's disdain for the status of probation, an attitude
which is reflected in the appeal, most certainly indicates an intent to
ignore the final terms and requirements of probation. This attitude
would appear to be the most sensible for corporations which are
similarly sentenced and must choose either the expense of complying
with the law or the nominal fine and possible reparations imposed for
continued violation. As admitted by a corporate officer in Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Lampert, 6 8 "[i]t's cheaper to pay claims than it is to
control flourides.,,69 This willful disregard of the law reflects a pragmatic approach that can be traced beyond the corporate entity and
may be directly attributed to the officers who direct the operations of
the company. When the opportunity to show good faith compliance
with the law by means of probation is ignored and successive prosecution for the same act is considered, the involvement of individuals
should not be overlooked. The purpose of determining individual, as
well as corporate, liability is to impose a penalty severe enough to make
compliance more advantageous than violation. 7 0
65. Id. at 278. Criminal contempt of a corporation and of an individual of the corporation was
noted by the Kormel court. See Gross v. United States, 228 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1956).
66. Despite the many proponents of greater liability for the individual corporate officers, their
actual conviction remains the exception. See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (2d Cir. 1943).
The argument that violation of § 411 and § 407 might be construed as an act of strict
liability is derived from the inference that § 407 does not require scienter. Section 411
states that liability may be imputed to "[e ]very person and every corporation ... [that
violates § 407] or that shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize or instigate a violation .... " 18
U.S.C. § 411 (1970) (emphasis added). Strict liability is supported by United States v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354,356 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But the prevailing view continues to be based on
the condition that a person must have knowledge of the violation and the authorIty to
remedy it. This comprises the guidelines of the Corps of Engineers, 33 C.F.R. § 209.170(4);
ct. United States v. Georgetown Univ., 331 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1971).
67. See note 63 supra.
68. 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963).
69. Id. at 466.
70. The stigma of personal guilt is generally more effective than an abstract finding of
corporate crime. Geis, Criminal Penalties tor Corporate Criminals, CRIM. LAW BULL. 377,
380 (1972): "The fact is that the corporate offender, brought up to be particularly
responsive to other's opinions about him-others of the same social class, at least-is
especially vulnerable to reform by threat of demeaning social sanctions."
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As the A tlantic Richfield court found the original terms of probation
requiring compliance with the standards of the River and Harbors Act
to be in excess of the lower court's authority, it is unlikely that it
would support the imposition of a collateral order of compliance upon
officers. Likewise, conditions of restoration or restitution were not
considered, presumably because they would have been viewed as requirements that exceed the severity of the $2,500 maximum penalty.
Contrary to this narrow view of the Probation Act, several cases have
upheld a broader and more affirmative use of probation.7 1 This ambulatory character of the punishment provides a means to impose three
types of conditions on the corporate probationer: (1) restorative,7 2 (2)
supervisory 73 and (3) rehabilitative. 74 The A tlantic Richfield court
ignored this test in its determination that despite the purpose of the
conditions they were "unreasonable standards to the extent that the
probationer may not know when they are satisfied."7 5 This conclusion
seems to contravene the definite order of the lower court to Atlantic
Richfield Company that it set up and complete a program within 45
days to handle the discharge of oil spillage into the soil and/or stream;
and, a probation officer would be appointed in the event that the
defendant failed to comply with the first condition. Such conditions
are hardly arbitrary or capricious, since there is a genuine attempt to
reform the offender by direction and supervision. The possible unfairness of such a purpose is to be compared with the corporate defiance of
legal restrictions, the further damage wrought in the name of "convenience" and the unbridled prosperity of a large corporation at the
expense of public resources. The wrongful act of the Atlantic Richfield
Company and the fruits thereof cannot be denied by an adverse finding
of "corporate crime" and the subsequent imposition of a fine as
sentence.
The decision of Atlantic Richfield represents an inadequate interpretation of a potentially effective means of dealing with a class of white
collar criminals that flaunt the law with alarming regularity and increasing openness. To view the Federal Probation Act as merely a passive
statute of limited use is to ignore its well established liberal construction as a remedial means to reform and supervise a defendant of
unusual character or circumstance. 7 6 The Atlantic Richfield court has
71. United States v. Berger, 145 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 848 (1945);
United States v. Coates & Gray, Crim. No. 72-0598 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 1973); United States v.
Mentor, Crim. No. 52254 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 1971). During the period of probation, a
defendant" [m lay be required to make restitution o~ reparation to aggrieved parties for
actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had .... " 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1970).
72. See note 68 supra.
73. See note 28 supra. As to a broader use of surveillance see Pound, Visitorial Jurisdiction
over the Corporation in Equity. 49 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1936).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
75. 465 F.2d at 61.
76. United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486,494 (M.D. Fla. 1972): "The inadequancy of
the criminal penalties provided by .... The River and Harbors Act is beyond dispute. [Itl
contains only meager monetary penalties."
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taken a narrow view of the types of probationary conditions which are
unduly harsh and has thereby effectively limited the lower court's
discretion in determining a proper remedy. However, the determination
that the Federal Probation Act is applicable to corporations remains as
a previously unexplored means of dealing with a complex and unusual
type of criminal. Although the Atlantic Richfield court dismissed with
disappointing brevity the issues of probation conditions more onerous
than sentence and a defendant's right to refuse probation, the use of
probation to control the corporate entity is a significant idea worthy of
further use and development by the jUdiciary. A comprehensive view of
the Federal Probation Act which encompasses restitution by the criminal to aggrieved parties, supervision of the criminal by the courts, and
the eventual reformation of the criminal into a positive member of
society logically includes the violations of the corporate entity. As long
as other means of dealing with the illegal acts of corporations remain
ineffective, the use of probation deserves further development.
Rignal W. Baldwin

COPYRIGHT-EXTENSIVE PHOTODUPLICATION OF COpyRIGHTED SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS BY LIBRARIES DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. WILLIAMS & WILKINS CO. V. UNITED STATES, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
The speed and ease of reproduction by modern photoduplication
equipment has resulted in. an increase in reproduction which has posed
a problem to copyright holders. Photocopying diminishes the need for
the original work and impairs the protection afforded the owner of the
copyright. It poses a growing threat to the balance between the
constitutional right of the people to the free dissemination of
information' and the statutory right of the copyright holder to control
the use of his work. 2 Unfortunately, the present copyright ace is vague
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective writings and Discoveries.
2. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) et. seq. (1970).
3. [d. The present Copyright Act was originally adopted in 1909. Since that time several
attempts at revision have been made beginning with the amendments proposed before the
Berne Convention in 1924. The Dallinger, Perkins and Vestal Bills were efforts to adhere to
the Berne Convention, as a result of which copyright protection was extended to the
motion picture industry. Following three more revisionary bills from 1931-39, and
amendments in accord with the 1954 Universal Copyright Convention, the Copyright Act
is still silent on what types and scope of copying, if any, do not constitute copyright
infringement. For the legislative history of U.S. copyright law see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
FROM 1901 to 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No.1, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-19 (1960).

